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General Assembly
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General Assembly
Fifty-fifth session
Agenda item 64
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Letter dated 8 February 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government and further to my letter dated 14 December 2000 (A/55/693-S/2000/1193), I have the honour to draw your attention to new massive violations of the flight information region of Nicosia and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by military aircraft of the Turkish Air Force, recorded on 1, 7, 10, 12, 18 and 20 December 2000, as well as on 7, 10, 12, 18, 23, 24, 28 and 29 January 2001.

On 1 December, one (1) Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia flight information region, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou in the occupied area of the Republic.

On 7 December, one (1) C-160 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia flight information region, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Karpasia (Cape of Apostolos Andreas), before exiting in a south-easterly direction. The C-160 aircraft returned later on the same day and entered once again the Nicosia flight information region, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Karpasia before exiting towards the flight information region of Ankara.

On 10 December, one (1) Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia flight information region, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Kormakitis, before returning to the flight information region of Ankara.

On 12 December, two (2) F-16 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia flight information region, violating international air traffic regulations before returning to the flight information region of Ankara. Furthermore, on the same day (12.12.2000), one (1) Turkish military aircraft took off from an illegal airport in the occupied area of the Republic and flew over the area of Kormakitis, violating

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international air traffic regulations, before returning afterwards to the flight information region of Ankara.

On 18 December, one (1) B-200 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia flight information region, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou in the occupied area of the Republic. The aircraft returned on the same day to the flight information region of Ankara.

On 20 December, one (1) F-4 and one (1) C-130 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia flight information region, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) The F-4 military aircraft violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Karpasia (Cape of Apostolos Andreas) before exiting in a south-easterly direction;

(b) The C-130 military aircraft violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the areas of Karpasia (Cape of Apostolos Andreas) before exiting in a south-easterly direction. The aircraft returned afterwards from the same direction;

On 7 January, one (1) "Cougar" Turkish military aircraft took off from the illegal airport of Tymbou in the occupied area of the Republic, violating international air traffic regulations, before returning to the flight information region of Ankara.

On 10 January, one (1) C-130 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia flight information region, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Karpasia (Cape of Apostolos Andreas), before exiting in a south-easterly direction. The C-130 aircraft returned later on the same day and entered once again the Nicosia flight information region, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Karpasia before exiting towards the flight information region of Ankara.

On 12 January, one (1) AB-200 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia flight information region, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Mesaoria, before landing first at the illegal airports of Tymbou and Krini, both in the occupied area of the Republic.

On 18 January, two (2) F-4 Turkish military aircraft coming from an easterly direction, entered the Nicosia flight information region, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Karpasia (Cape of Apostolos Andreas), before returning to the flight information region of Ankara.

On 23 January, one (1) B-200 and two (2) "Agusta Bell" Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia flight information region, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus as follows:

(a) The B-200 military aircraft entered the Nicosia flight information region, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou in the occupied

area of the Republic, from where it took off later on the same day, returning to the flight information region of Ankara;

(b) The two (2) "Agusta Bell" Turkish military aircraft took off from the illegal airport of Krini and violating international air traffic regulations, flying towards the northern part of the Nicosia flight information region, from where one of them exited towards the flight information region of Ankara and the other returned and landed at the same airport in the occupied area of the Republic.

On 24 January, one (1) C-160 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia flight information region, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Karpasia (Cape of Apostolos Andreas), before exiting in a south-easterly direction. The aircraft returned afterwards from the same direction and entered once again the Nicosia flight information region, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Karpasia (Cape of Apostolos Andreas), before returning afterwards to the flight information region of Ankara.

On 28 January, one (1) CN-235 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia flight information region, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou in the occupied area of the Republic, returning afterwards to the flight information region of Ankara.

On 29 January, one (1) F-4 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia flight information region, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Karpasia (Cape of Apostolos Andreas), before exiting in a south-easterly direction.

Finally, on the same day (29 January), two (2) CN-235 and one (1) "Gulfstream", all Turkish military aircraft, entered the Nicosia flight information region, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus as follows:

(a) One (1) CN-235 military aircraft violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou in the occupied area of the Republic and from where it took off on the same day returning to the flight information region of Ankara;

(b) One (1) "Gulfstream" military aircraft violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou in the occupied area of the Republic, from where it took off on the next day (30 January) and returned to the flight information region of Ankara.

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, I strongly protest the above-mentioned actions, which violate international law as well as the Security Council resolutions on Cyprus, and call for their cessation. I would like to note that these violations are taking place at a time when the international community expects the Turkish side to reverse its decision not to attend the next round of negotiations, under your auspices. The Government of Turkey should abide by the Charter of the United Nations, respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and contribute towards finding a just and viable solution to the Cyprus problem on the basis of United Nations resolutions.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 64, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Sotos **Zackheos**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Fifty-fifth session
Agenda item 20 (b)
Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special economic assistance: special economic assistance to individual countries or regions

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Letter dated 1 February 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to forward to Your Excellency's kind consideration a letter addressed to Your Excellency from H. E. Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail, Minister for External Relations and Current Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the resolution adopted by the IGAD Summit, held in Khartoum on 23 November 2000 in support of the reconciliation efforts and assisting Somalia in its efforts for the realization of peace and national reconciliation and unity.

I would be grateful if you would have the letter and the resolution circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda 20 (b) and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mubarak Hussein **Rahmtalla**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Resolution of the 8th IGAD Summit of Heads of State and Government on Somalia

We, Heads of State and Government of IGAD member States, meeting in Khartoum on 23 November 2000, on the occasion of the 8th IGAD Summit,

Considering the decade-long crisis in Somalia aggravated by the absence of a central government in that country,

Considering further the commendable efforts made by Ethiopia (country mandated by IGAD), the OAU, the Arab League and the United Nations in order to settle the internal conflict in Somalia,

Reaffirming the crucial role of IGAD in the settlement of the crisis and the restoration of peace in Somalia and the subregion,

Applauding the initiative taken by H. E. Ismael Omar Guelleh, President of the Republic of Djibouti to promote peace and national reconciliation in Somalia by convening the Arta Conference leading to the establishment of a Transitional Government for Somalia,

Recalling the resolution of the 7th Summit of the Heads of States and Governments of IGAD member States endorsing the peace initiative for Somalia of H. E. President of the Republic of Djibouti,

Noting that some parties in Somalia, including the self-administering areas of the country with relative peace and stability, have not participated in the national reconciliation efforts so far:

1. *Affirm* that the Arta Peace Conference that resulted in the establishment of the transitional Government for Somalia, constituted a major achievement in the Somali peace process;

2. *Urge* the Transitional Government and all parties and administrations of Somalia to create the environment that would bring into the process those that did not participate at the Arta Conference with the objective of widening and deepening the process of national reconciliation;

3. *Insist* that the peace process in Somalia must continue and be completed through dialogue and not by resorting to the use of force;

4. *Encourage* Somalia's neighbours and the current Chairman of IGAD to establish a mechanism that would enable them to continue to assist the Somalis to achieve full peace, national reconciliation, and unity;

5. *Affirm* the need for all necessary measures to be taken to ensure that the territory of Somalia is not used as a springboard by groups inimical to the peace and security of the subregion;

6. *Reaffirm* IGAD's commitment to the unity and territorial integrity of Somalia;

7. *Welcome* the participation of the Transitional Government of Somalia in the deliberations and activities of IGAD, bearing in mind that regular and continuing evaluation of progress towards peace and national reconciliation in the country will be carried out;

8. *Urgently* call upon the international community to support the rehabilitation in Somalia through direct assistance to the Transitional Government and the regions which had established peace and stability through self-administration, as long as they are committed to the peace process.

Annex to the letter dated 1 February 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic]

I have the honour to inform you that the meetings held at the Eighth Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), hosted by my country on 23 and 24 November 2000, accorded particular attention to the question of Somalia. This led to the participation of the Transitional Government of Somalia in the work of the Summit, to its adoption of a resolution expressing support for the efforts being made for reconciliation and to the establishment of a committee of Somalia's neighbouring States to be chaired by the Sudan in order "to continue to assist the Somalis to achieve full peace, national reconciliation and unity". (A copy of the resolution is attached.)

I further inform you that consultations among the IGAD States are continuing with a view to ensuring the implementation of the outcome of the Khartoum Summit and mobilizing regional and international support for rehabilitation and reconstruction following the destruction caused by the civil war in Somalia.

We look to the international community and to the United Nations to play their part in establishing peace and rebuilding Somalia.

(*Signed*) Mustafa Osman **Ismail**
Minister for External Relations of the Republic of the Sudan

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Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special economic assistance: special economic assistance to individual countries or regions

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Letter dated 1 February 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to forward for your kind consideration a letter addressed to you from His Excellency Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail, Minister for External Relations and Current Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the resolution adopted by the IGAD Summit, held in Khartoum on 23 November 2000 in support of the reconciliation efforts and assisting Somalia in its efforts for the realization of peace and national reconciliation and unity (see annexes).

I would be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 20 (b), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mubarak Hussein **Rahmtalla**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* Reissued for technical reasons.

01-24458* (E) 120201

Annex I to the letter dated 1 February 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic]

I have the honour to inform you that the meetings held at the Eighth Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), hosted by my country on 23 and 24 November 2000, accorded particular attention to the question of Somalia. This led to the participation of the Transitional Government of Somalia in the work of the Summit, to its adoption of a resolution expressing support for the efforts being made for reconciliation and to the establishment of a committee of Somalia's neighbouring States to be chaired by the Sudan in order "to continue to assist the Somalis to achieve full peace, national reconciliation and unity". (A copy of the resolution is attached.)

I further inform you that consultations among the IGAD States are continuing with a view to ensuring the implementation of the outcome of the Khartoum Summit and mobilizing regional and international support for rehabilitation and reconstruction following the destruction caused by the civil war in Somalia.

We look to the international community and to the United Nations to play their part in establishing peace and rebuilding Somalia.

(*Signed*) Mustafa Osman **Ismail**
Minister for External Relations of the Republic of the Sudan

Annex II to the letter dated 1 February 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Resolution adopted by the Eighth Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development on Somalia

We, Heads of State and Government of IGAD member States, meeting in Khartoum on 23 November 2000 on the occasion of the Eighth IGAD Summit,

Considering the decade-long crisis in Somalia aggravated by the absence of a central government in that country,

Considering further the commendable efforts made by Ethiopia (country mandated by IGAD), the Organization of African Unity, the Arab League and the United Nations in order to settle the internal conflict in Somalia,

Reaffirming the crucial role of IGAD in the settlement of the crisis and the restoration of peace in Somalia and the subregion,

Applauding the initiative taken by His Excellency Ismael Omar Guelleh, President of the Republic of Djibouti, to promote peace and national reconciliation in Somalia by convening the Arta Conference leading to the establishment of a Transitional Government for Somalia,

Recalling the resolution of the Seventh Summit of the Heads of State and Government of IGAD member States endorsing the peace initiative for Somalia of His Excellency the President of the Republic of Djibouti,

Noting that some parties in Somalia, including the self-administering areas of the country with relative peace and stability, have not participated in the national reconciliation efforts so far:

1. *Affirm* that the Arta Peace Conference that resulted in the establishment of the Transitional Government for Somalia, constituted a major achievement in the Somali peace process;

2. *Urge* the Transitional Government and all parties and administrations of Somalia to create the environment that would bring into the process those that did not participate at the Arta Conference with the objective of widening and deepening the process of national reconciliation;

3. *Insist* that the peace process in Somalia must continue and be completed through dialogue and not by resorting to the use of force;

4. *Encourage* Somalia's neighbours and the current Chairman of IGAD to establish a mechanism that would enable them to continue to assist the Somalis to achieve full peace, national reconciliation, and unity;

5. *Affirm* the need for all necessary measures to be taken to ensure that the territory of Somalia is not used as a springboard by groups inimical to the peace and security of the subregion;

6. *Reaffirm* IGAD's commitment to the unity and territorial integrity of Somalia;

7. *Welcome* the participation of the Transitional Government of Somalia in the deliberations and activities of IGAD, bearing in mind that regular and continuing evaluation of progress towards peace and national reconciliation in the country will be carried out;

8. *Urgently* call upon the international community to support the rehabilitation in Somalia through direct assistance to the Transitional Government and the regions which had established peace and stability through self-administration, as long as they are committed to the peace process.

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Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special economic assistance

The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security

Letter dated 8 February 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to forward herewith the text of a letter dated 7 February 2001 addressed to you by His Excellency Burhân-ud-din Rabbâni, President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 20 and 46, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ravan **Farhâdi**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

01-24493 (E) 090201

Annex to the letter dated 8 February 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Extending my best wishes for your health and well-being, I seize the moment to express our appreciation for your interest in finding a solution to the Afghan crisis and facilitating aid for the oppressed people of Afghanistan.

You are aware that the Afghan nation, as a result of the imposed war and blatant foreign intervention, compounded by the drought, has faced burdensome hardships. Additionally, the continued Taliban military offensives during the current harsh winter, shortages of food and aid, leading to the displacement of tens of thousands of Afghan families, the brutal winter and the closed borders of our neighbouring States — all constitute a tragedy for our nation, one where the death of hundreds of internally displaced persons manifests the immensity of such a tragedy.

On the other hand, the forced expulsion of thousands of Afghan refugee families from Pakistan is another sad event in the series of endless grievances of this oppressed nation. It would have been better if Pakistan, instead of deporting these oppressed refugees, would have prevented the crossing of armed consignments, which enter Afghanistan from Pakistan on a regular basis with the aim of carrying out mass execution of the people, destroying and torching their houses and villages.

As per your request, Mr. Kamal Hosain, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, while expressing concern regarding the summary execution of innocent civilians in Yaka-owlang by the Taliban, also requested the parties to the conflict to take steps towards a cessation of hostilities.

Welcoming this humane request wholeheartedly, the Islamic State of Afghanistan is ready to put an end to the conflict and to start, under the supervision of the United Nations, negotiations with the Taliban.

It is our wish that the Taliban, instead of continuing the path of war and dragging the oppressed Afghan nation towards additional horrendous tragedies, deploy efforts towards the termination of the crisis. Reminded of God's wrath, judgement of history and anger of the Afghan nation, they are to take no more strides in the annihilation and abjectness of the people.

While expressing appreciation for your noble and human feelings regarding Afghanistan, I should like to draw your attention to alleviating the humanitarian situation of the people and to assisting us in putting a stop to the crisis in Afghanistan.

(*Signed*) Professor Burhanuddin **Rabbani**
President
Islamic State of Afghanistan

Badakhshan, Afghanistan, 7 February 2001

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English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 6 February 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 6 February 2001 from Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq. The Minister calls attention to the ongoing wanton aggression against Iraq by United States and British aircraft in the unlawful no-flight zones and to the fact that in the period from 26 January to 1 February 2001 they carried out 145 sorties, 52 of them from Saudi Arabia, 35 from Kuwait and 58 from Turkey.

The Minister reaffirms the Government of Iraq's condemnation of these acts of aggression against Iraqi territory, and he states that international responsibility for them must be borne by the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the countries that provide the logistic support for this aggression, namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey. He urges you to perform the duties assigned to you under the Charter by halting this unwarranted aggression and ensuring that it does not recur.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed **Al-Humaimidi**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Annex to the identical letters dated 6 February 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

I should like to inform you that United States and British warplanes based in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey have continued to violate the airspace of the Republic of Iraq. They carried out 145 sorties in the period from 26 January to 1 February 2001, 52 of them from Saudi Arabia, 35 from Kuwait and 58 from Turkey, as shown hereunder.

1. In the northern region 58 sorties were flown at speeds of 720 to 780 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 12,000 metres, as follows:

(a) At 1100 hours on 29 January 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 12 missions from Turkish territory, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Zakho, Amadiyah and Ayn Zalah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1335 hours, drove them off.

(b) At 1045 hours on 30 January 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15 and F-16 aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 16 missions from Turkish territory, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Zakho, Baibo, Aqrah, Amadiyah and Dohuk areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1345 hours, drove them off.

(c) At 1030 hours on 31 January 2001, United States and British F-15, F-16 and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 16 missions from Turkish territory, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Dohuk, Mosul, Irbil, Aqrah, Tall Afar, Ayn Zalah and Amadiyah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1335 hours, drove them off.

(d) At 1030 hours on 1 February 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15 and F-16 aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 14 missions from Turkish territory, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Amadiyah, Dohuk, Mosul, Irbil, Tall Afar and Ayn Zalah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1330 hours, drove them off.

2. In the southern region 87 sorties were flown at speeds of 720 to 780 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 9,000 to 13,000 metres, as follows:

(a) At 2015 hours on 26 January 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 18 missions, 14 of them from Saudi territory with the support of two AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and four from Kuwaiti territory with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Basrah, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Shinafiyah, Lasaf,

Ashbajah, Mashkhab, Qal'at Sukkar and Qurnah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 2125 hours, drove them off.

(b) At 1055 hours on 27 January 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 19 missions, eight of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 11 from Kuwaiti territory with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Safwan, Artawi, Jalibah, Busayyah, Basrah, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Hayy, Najaf and Lasaf areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 2220 hours, drove them off.

(c) At 1910 hours on 28 January 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 14 missions, six of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and eight from Kuwaiti territory with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Basrah, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Najaf, Diwaniyah, Karbala', Kut, Salman and Shaykh Sa'd areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 2025 hours, drove them off.

(d) At 1210 hours on 29 January 2001, United States and British F-15, F-16 and EA-6B aircraft coming from Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out four missions, were supported by an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace and overflew the Faw, Umm Qasr, Jalibah and Basrah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1315 hours, drove them off.

(e) At 1930 hours on 30 January 2001, United States and British F-15 and F-16 aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 16 missions, 10 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and six from Kuwaiti territory with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Busayyah, Samawah, Lasaf, Artawi, Taqtaqanah, Ukhaydir, Qal'at Sukkar, Nasiriyah, Rumaythah, Shinafiyah, Afak, Hashimiyah, Kut, Shaykh Sa'd, Nu'maniyah, Qurnah and Basrah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 2150 hours, drove them off.

(f) At 1935 hours on 1 February 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15 and F-16 aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 16 missions, 14 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and two from Kuwaiti territory with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Qurnah, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Shinafiyah, Lasaf, Ashbajah and Qal'at Sukkar areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 2050 hours, drove them off.

This aggression illustrates the bellicose attitude being maintained by the United States of America and the United Kingdom towards Iraq. Since 1992, it has

become a fixed policy aimed at undermining the country's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and at the systematic and concerted destruction of Iraqi lives, infrastructure and civilian installations. It is a policy that has been affirmed in successive statements made by United States and British officials.

The Government of Iraq categorically rejects the two so-called no-flight zones, which were imposed by unilateral decision of the United States of America and the United Kingdom and lack any legal basis. Iraq rejects all the consequences of this illegal decision and, in particular, the flimsy excuses and pretexts used by these States in an attempt to justify their military aggression against our country.

The logistic support provided by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey to the Americans and the British has made these countries key partners in the aggression being committed against Iraq, so that they bear full international responsibility under international law. This includes liability for full compensation for the loss and damage, in both human and material terms, that is caused by these illegal practices.

The Government of Iraq further renews its call to the countries participating in this aggression to desist forthwith from internationally prohibited acts that violate Iraq's sovereignty, place its security and integrity in grave danger and pose a direct and serious threat to international peace and security.

As it condemns these acts of aggression against Iraqi targets and installations, the Government of Iraq urges you to perform the duties assigned to you under the Charter as they relate to the maintenance of international peace and security by intervening with the governments of the countries in question with a view to inducing them to halt, end and desist from any resumption of their constant and unwarranted aggression against an independent, sovereign State.

(*Signed*) Tariq **Aziz**
Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs



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Letter dated 8 February 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Angola to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the message from His Excellency Dr. Joao Bernardo de Miranda, Minister for External Relations of the Republic of Angola, dated 6 February (see annex), with the request that the present document and its annex be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Jose Goncalves Martins **Patricio**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

01-24567 (E) 090201

Annex to the letter dated 8 February 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Angola to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On 20 February 2001, the Security Council will examine the report concerning the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1295 (2000).

Addressing the refusal of the UNITA wing, led by Mr. Savimbi, to abide by the Peace Accords it signed with the Angolan Government, choosing instead to return to war in order to reclaim its interests, the Security Council decreed mandatory international sanctions against that organization, namely through its resolutions 864 (1993), 1127 (1997) and 1173 (1998).

Such sanctions anticipate, among other things, the prohibition of the furnishing of any military support, either logistical, financial or material to the rebels, the freezing of its funds and bank accounts in foreign countries and the prohibition of the international cross-border movement of its leaders and adult members of their families.

The application of the sanctions, along with the efforts pursued by my Government with a view to fulfilling the requirements of the Lusaka Protocol, to arriving at genuine national reconciliation and to permitting the stabilization of the peace, has, on the one hand, contributed to the significant reduction of the military capacity of the rebels and, on the other hand, has persuaded thousands of them to abandon the war and become part of the ongoing democratic process in Angola.

It is fitting here to emphasize the positive impact of the Amnesty Law for crimes committed during the conflict, an initiative of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, recently adopted by the Angolan Parliament. This law has already permitted the reintegration of thousands of ex-rebels. In the body of this law, my Government has called for dialogue with all those who have abandoned the war option, in order to bring about the effective end of the obligations of the Lusaka Protocol.

In spite of this, some elements of the rebel group continue to plant death and destruction, making civilians their principal target.

The sanctions constitute the most effective instrument of pressure, which the Security Council and the international community have at their disposal, to persuade the UNITA wing that has withdrawn from the Peace Accords to return to them. Therefore, it has become urgent to maintain international pressure on UNITA's armed wing.

My Government repeats that the attainment of a lasting peace in Angola should come about in the context of the political-juridical situation established by the Bicesse Accords and by the Lusaka Protocol. This situation continues to be valid and has the full support of the Security Council and of the United Nations and the international community as a whole.

The Angolan Government welcomes the most recent report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions, established as a result of resolution 1295 (2000). We are worried, however, at the observations over the systematic violations of sanctions and the collusion that exists between the armed wing of UNITA and

transnational organized crime networks linked to the international traffic of diamonds and of arms.

The diamond traffic constitutes today the main sustenance of rebel groups in Africa, and in Angola in particular. The report of the Monitoring Mechanism describes, in an exhaustive and sustained form, the extent of the traffic in blood diamonds, removed illegally from Angola by the wing of UNITA led by Mr. Savimbi, and the international channels which bypass national laws and international norms and introduce them into the international marketplace.

Connected to this illicit trade one finds a well-structured network of money-laundering, falsification of documents and trafficking in conventional arms, the main reasons for the massive flow of arms in the regions of Africa affected by conflicts.

Angola hopes that in the session of the Security Council on 20 February, the members of this body can examine these questions in an exhaustive manner and find effective solutions, along the lines recommended in the report.

In summary, my Government stresses that the following elements should be considered:

1. The necessity of strengthening the sanctions against the armed wing of UNITA, in keeping with Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations and of paragraph 3 of resolution 1295 (2000);

2. The necessity of strengthening the current system of control and supervision of the sanctions, in order to obtain better cooperation from States;

3. Enlarging of the mandate of the monitoring mechanism in order to include the presenting of suggestions, to bring about the judicial prosecution of companies and individuals who violate the sanctions;

4. Strong condemnation and the adoption of appropriate measures to combat the support of the networks of the traffickers of arms and diamonds to the armed wing of UNITA;

5. The Security Council should also consider the necessity of adopting measures against the countries involved in violations of sanctions.

To close, I want to reaffirm the determination of my Government in continuing to develop all its efforts, so that peace will become a reality in Angola in the short term.

(*Signed*) Joao Bernardo **de Miranda**
Minister for External Relations

United Nations S/2001/124

Security Council

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Letter dated 6 February 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 5 February 2001 from Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, to which is appended a series of excerpts from a book by Mr. Giandomenico Picco entitled *Man Without a Gun*. In his book, Mr. Picco discloses the facts concerning the collusion of Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, former Secretary-General of the United Nations, in a deal for the release of the Western hostages in Lebanon in exchange for his publishing a report assigning responsibility for initiating the Iraq-Iran war to Iraq, thus violating the mechanisms established by Security Council resolution 598 (1987).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed **Al-Humaimidi**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

01-24659 (E) 130201 130201

Annex to the letter dated 6 February 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

One result of the emergence of the so-called new world order is the use of international mechanisms, and specifically the United Nations, to advance the political objectives of certain internationally dominant parties. Iraq was among the first victims of the unlawful use of such international mechanisms. Since early 1990, Iraq has been calling attention to the dangers this policy poses to the credibility of the United Nations and to the principle of the rule of law, and it has called for the repudiation of opportunistic and sordid policies that run counter to the trend of history.

The passage of time and subsequent events have confirmed the error of policies from which the international community has reaped nothing but further disasters and further manifestations of hegemony and of the use of brute force to the detriment of international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

As an example of the unlawful exploitation of international mechanisms, I should like to present to you and, through you, to the States Members of the United Nations, the case described hereunder.

1. On 20 July 1987, the Security Council adopted its resolution 598 (1987), on the conflict between Iraq and Iran. Iraq accepted it, and Iran rejected it for almost an entire year. When Iran finally did accept the resolution, it became the basis for a political settlement between the two countries. In paragraph 6 of the resolution, the Security Council:

> "*Requests* the Secretary-General to explore, in consultation with Iran and Iraq, the question of entrusting an impartial body with inquiring into responsibility for the conflict and to report to the Council as soon as possible."

Between 1987 and 1991, no attempt was made to discuss mechanisms for "entrusting an impartial body with inquiring into responsibility for the conflict" because there were urgent tasks to be undertaken that related to the enforcement of the ceasefire, the withdrawal of the forces of each party from the territory of the other, the exchange of prisoners and the normalization of relations between the two countries.

2. On 9 December 1991, a few days before the expiry of his term of office, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, issued a further report on the implementation of resolution 598 (1987) that contained a conclusion on his part assigning responsibility for initiating the conflict to Iraq (see document S/23273).

3. Iraq responded to the Secretary-General's conclusion with a letter dated 22 December 1991 from its Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/23311, annex and enclosure) stating that paragraph 6 of resolution 598 (1987) had concerned the question of entrusting an impartial body with inquiring into responsibility for the conflict in consultation with Iraq and Iran; that the Secretary-General had not been authorized by the resolution to publish such a conclusion; and that his report had been linked to the deal made by the Secretary-General with Iran for the release of the American hostages in Lebanon.

4. In 1999 former Assistant Secretary-General Giandomenico Picco published a book entitled *Man Without a Gun*, and in it he provides evidence and facts that indicate that the report of former Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar holding Iraq responsible for initiating the conflict with Iran was indeed the price paid to Iran in exchange for facilitating the release of the American and European hostages being held in Lebanon. In his book, Mr. Picco presents details of the Secretary-General's contacts, through him, with Iran, Lebanon and Israel for the purpose of closing this deal to Iraq's detriment and in violation of the mechanisms established by resolution 598 (1987).

Accordingly, the report of former Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar dated 9 December 1991 is to be considered null and void and inoperative.

I am transmitting to you herewith excerpts from Mr. Picco's book documenting these events.

(*Signed*) Tariq **Aziz**
Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs

Enclosure

[Original: English]

Man Without a Gun

One Diplomat's Secret Struggle to Free the Hostages, Fight Terrorism, and End a War

Giandomenico Picco

TIMES BOOKS
RANDOM HOUSE

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Kamal Kharrazi, later appointed foreign minister of Iran in 1997, had just been named ambassador to the United Nations in New York. He denied the charges that Iranian weapons were being sent to Europe and repeated Teheran's interest in improving relations with Washington. How? He had a list of four items: the United States could release frozen Iranian assets, it could lift the embargo on the shipment of several hundred million dollars' worth of weapons bought and paid for by the shah before his ouster in 1979; it could provide support for the Algiers agreement, which the shah and Saddam Hussein had signed in 1975 to delineate the border between the two countries; and it could urge Saddam to withdraw the Iraqi troops who had continued to occupy a piece of Iranian territory since the end of the war. Iran, Kharrazi said, would use its influence on the question of the hostages. He also invited the secretary-general to present to Iran a complete package for the solution to the hostage problem. Kharrazi's direct line to Rafsanjani was already common knowledge as he began his tenure in New York. With his shortlist, he had just served notice to the Americans and the secretary-general that he would be a serious player, not just a government mouthpiece.

Zarif called me in late July to arrange an urgent meeting for the next morning. On July 27, we met in my office. He stated that his government was now moving full speed ahead to assist the secretary-general in closing the hostage file before the end of his term in office. It appeared that all internal opposition had been overcome and that President Rafsanjani was now fully on board. Rafsanjani also wanted Pérez de Cuéllar to visit Teheran soon so that all agreements could be finalized for the conclusion of the hostage affair. Given that our bosses were holding us responsible, Zarif and I were aware as we discussed the various permutations that neither of us could count on what other governments would do. At the end of the day, it would come down to us. So we began to examine what was and wasn't there. There would be no money involved and no assurance that guarantees from other governments would stick. At the center of our work was the politics of the Gulf, which we both understood well. We had worked on the end of the Iran-Iraq war, we knew how the cease-fire had come about, and we knew why Iraq had finally accepted the border between the two countries and withdrawn its occupying troops from Iranian soil.

What else did Iran want after all that? It all seemed to fit into place. Zarif and I each had a big card to play, and we would argue for months about who would go first. But the core of our deal was clear, and if we both delivered, the operation could not be sidetracked by any other government. It was a deceptively simple swap: Iran would do its level best with the groups in Lebanon to free the hostages, and we would deliver Paragraph 6 of UN Resolution 598. If we could get more than that—freedom for Lebanese detainees in Israeli prisons, information about missing Iranians in Beirut and Israeli airmen and soldiers in Lebanon, American "goodwill" reciprocity—it would be frosting on the cake. But the game turned on Paragraph 6.

We knew that Teheran wanted a formal condemnation of Iraq for

starting the war in 1980, but until then we had not realized how crucial it was for it politically. And, of course, the ability to deliver such a condemnation happened to rest in the hands of the secretary-general himself. Paragraph 6 of the Security Council's cease-fire resolution of 1988 specifically requested the secretary-general "to explore, in consultation with Iran and Iraq, the question of entrusting an impartial body with inquiring into responsibility for the conflict and to report to the Security Council as soon as possible." At the time Resolution 598 was drafted, no one could have imagined the role its sixth paragraph was to play in freeing the hostages. The mullahs—indeed, the Iranian people—saw it as a way to obtain justice, which mattered so much to them after all their suffering in the war.

I did not want to commit us too hastily because I wanted to play Paragraph 6 for all I could get—all the hostages, not just some of them. But I told Zarif that I thought we could go ahead with the idea, which in fact was a matter of conscience. The secretary-general's visit to Teheran could be even more successful if Paragraph 6 were implemented at the same time. Zarif responded. In private diplomatic conversations, no one ever expressed doubt that the Iraqis had initiated a massive military offensive on September 22, 1980, although only one person of international stature—German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher—had said so in public. Pérez de Cuéllar and I believed any impartial body couldn't help but reach the same conclusion, though we obviously could not guarantee the outcome.

When Pérez de Cuéllar met with Ambassador Kharrazi on August 1, 1991, he made it clear that he intended to be in touch with Iran and Iraq about Paragraph 6, but he made no formal commitment of how and when he intended to appoint a committee to assess the responsibility for the war. He also made it clear that he wanted a closure of the hostage file in the shortest possible time. Over the next couple of days, Zarif and I went through several iterations of our hostage-release plan, including my "detention" in Lebanon as insurance and the conclusion of the work on Paragraph 6 of Resolution 598. The Iranians also agreed that the search for Ron Arad would be part of the package. At that point, we had yet to make any contact with the government of Israel. Most important, Kharrazi and Zarif said that the groups in Lebanon were now prepared to proceed speedily with the first hostage releases to the secretary-general to make clear to the world that he was the channel to close the entire file.

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On August 7, Pérez de Cuéllar briefed Scowcroft on our discussions with the Iranians over the past two weeks. By that time I was already on my way to Beirut. A day earlier, the Islamic Jihad in Beirut had indicated that it would soon communicate with the secretary-general of the United Nations and send a special messenger to him so that the release of all the hostages could take place. The Iranians were trying to force our hand on Paragraph 6 and the visit of the secretary-general to Teheran; we were trying to force them to get the hostages released. They blinked first.

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On the day of my arrival, Velayati and I met at his home. It was 10 P.M., and since early morning I had been on the go with meeting after meeting. The foreign minister's main concern was the outlook for the UN-sponsored study on the responsibility for the Iran-Iraq war, or what we now referred to simply as "Paragraph 6." Three European professors had been entrusted by the secretary-general to study the matter, I told him. Velayati and the foreign minister of Iraq had already received a formal letter requesting the presentation of their respective versions of the facts as a basis for the professors' study. I could not predict the results of the study, I said, and in any event the results would need to be announced in New York, not Teheran. I then asked if the secretary-general's visit would be a success, to which he answered that he was pleased that the study was definitely under way. We understood each other perfectly.

That day, other Iranian officials had been pressuring me to reveal what the secretary-general's conclusion on Paragraph 6 would be, even though the three professors had yet to complete their work. For my part, I had insisted on the need to get some information on Ron Arad. By then, two names seemed relevant in the search. Mustafa Durani, a Lebanese Shiite militant whose allegiance over the years had varied between pro-Syrian and pro-Iranian groups, had held Arad in captivity at some point in 1989. The second person was Mohammed Hassan Azkari, commander of the Pasdaran, the contingent of Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. If I could gain access to these two, I told my Iranian interlocutors, I might learn something about Arad. They were noncommittal but said they would think about my request.

By the time I left Teheran for Switzerland in the early hours of August 30, I knew that if the Israelis were to reciprocate for receiving precise information about the bodies of Fink and Alsheik with the release of some fifty prisoners, we would be able to move ahead. Later that day, I met with Lubrani at the Savoy Hotel in Zurich.

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The logistical chaos of the past seventy-two hours hadn't prevented the one meeting that counted, the one between Pérez de Cuéllar and Rafsanjani. The Iranians had Paragraph 6--what they hoped would be an official judgment naming Iraq the aggressor in their eight-year war—front and center in their minds. My Iranian interlocutors over the past half-dozen years—Nasseri and Zarif, Kharrazi and Vaezi—were all in Teheran, and they peppered me with questions about Paragraph 6, to the point where I felt psychologically tortured by their repeated inquiries.

First and foremost, they wanted to know about the secretary-general's "expectation" for the report being prepared for him and how he might respond. A satisfactory answer, they seemed to suggest, was their quid pro quo for further assistance in the release of Western hostages.

Not surprisingly, the private meeting between Rafsanjani and Pérez de Cuéllar started with Paragraph 6. The Iranian president tried to pin down the secretary-general as to the date when the report would be complete. I wanted to say it would be finished only when the entire hostage slate had been wiped clean. Pérez de Cuéllar said it was his wish that the report be finished by the end of October. By that he really meant he expected all the hostages to be released by then.

For Rafsanjani, the report on Paragraph 6 was so important that he openly stated that any previous linkage between the Iranian frozen assets in the United States and the hostage crisis "had been cut by his government." "We have no intention of linking the two things," he said.

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I spent three days in New York urging the Iranians to follow up on our discussions and specifically to impress upon both Akhtari in Damascus and the groups in Lebanon the understanding that Rafsanjani had achieved with the secretary-general. Meanwhile, Pérez de Cuéllar received from Iran its complete version of how the war against Iraq had started. The Iraqis never replied to a similar request, so the European professors did not have Baghdad's input for their study on Paragraph 6.

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The Iranians met with me to try to extract the nature and timing of the report on Paragraph 6. They were certain that any honest professor could reach only one conclusion, so for them the only remaining question was when and how the professors' conclusions could be presented to Iran's best advantage. Through an off-loading of responsibility by the great powers in drafting the cease-fire resolution, the secretary-general alone was responsible for the report. It was the only leverage on the Iranians that he and I had as individuals, irrespective of what governments might do. I would never recommend that the secretary-general give this up for anything less than a full resolution of the hostage problem. The report was really all that mattered now to the Iranians, and the hostages became only a means to an end in obtaining it.

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Zarif wanted the secretary-general to let Teheran know what the report on Paragraph 6 said before all the hostages were released, but I was not going to waste my only trump card. I argued that if he pressed for an early release of the report, it would appear that Iran doubted the secretary-general's word. On the contrary, I said, the greater the gap between the release of the hostages and the release of the report, the greater the

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weight would be accorded a document we both assumed would identify Iraq as the instigator of the Iran-Iraq war.

Iran wanted to conclude the hostage saga by November 25. But true to form, the dates and procedures suggested by Iranian officials would not come to pass. Zarif now asked specifically if the report on Paragraph 6 could be issued during the week of the twenty-fifth. I reminded him that I had received nothing about the body of Colonel Higgins, nor about the fate of Alec Collett and several others.

We received the report on Paragraph 6 from the European professors in early November but told no one. I took all three copies home and hid them among my other books. The report was academically solid and nonpolitical, and avoided the more inflammatory accusations the Iranians wanted. But it did accuse Iraq of entering Iran with ten armored divisions on September 22, 1980. Although there had been other border skirmishes, the academics judged that the Iraqi tank attack had been a disproportionate reaction and a violation of international law. The freedom of the remaining hostages now depended on this report.

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For us, the day was significant for another reason as well: in New York, the secretary-general's office released Pérez de Cuéllar's Paragraph 6 report on the origin of the war between Iran and Iraq. It took guts. There was little doubt that Iraq had started the conflict, but the argument could have been made that the report was a straight quid pro quo: Iranian support for the hostage-release operation in return for an official document labeling Iraq the aggressor. The fact was, however, that the context of the report had nothing to do with its findings. Well-respected academics had concluded formally and in great detail what everyone in international affairs had known for years. If there was a deal, it was to state the truth in exchange for the freedom of the hostages, both of which were the right things to do, whether in tandem or separately.

The other bone of contention was whether the report could have bought not only the Western hostages but also Ron Arad and the other Israeli MIAs—an argument-cum-accusation leveled at us by Uri Lubrani and his team. I had struggled with this issue personally before the Israelis raised it. Could we have linked the entire operation to Arad? Could we have risked linking the freedom of the hostages to one MIA? But by early September, we were already committed to the Iranian government: How could we even contemplate breaking the word of the United Nations' highest official? Second, we did not believe that incoming Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali would share our commitment: Would an Egyptian national, even one in the top spot at the United Nations, issue a report critical of a major Arab country? Delaying the report, we thought, might mean that it never got released at all.

The report itself was clear on the central point: "Accordingly the outstanding event under the violations referred to in paragraph 5 above is the attack of 22 September 1980 against Iran, which cannot be justified under the Charter of the United Nations, any recognized rules and principles of international law or any principles of international morality and entails the responsibility for the conflict."*

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It was front-page news in Teheran, sent Iraq to the bicarbonate of soda, but went largely unnoticed elsewhere in the Middle East. Zarif expressed Iran's thanks and appreciation to the secretary-general and said the release of the reports would speed the return of the bodies of Higgins and Buckley. As usual, his timing was off.